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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines a paradox noticed in the development of land tenure systems in eastern Africa 
during the late- and post-colonial periods. The Kenyan state attempted to activate land markets in its 
Central Province, yet land transactions therein remained constrained; the Rwandan state attempted to 
restrict land markets, but land transactions multiplied. The paper explores this paradox through new 
institutionalist theories of institutional change. It argues that newly introduced formal land laws failed to 
achieve their land-market goals because they were less able to respond to the demands of economic 
actors than were the existing informal rules. Conceptual work in the new institutional economics explains 
why informal and formal land tenure institutions do not always cohere. From there, this paper moves to 
explain the two cases’ informal land institutions by examining the demand-side factors of population 
density and commercialisation of agriculture in each area. It suggests that land market activity in the two 
cases was comparable due to similar demand-side pressures. As for the formal land laws, the paper, 
recognising the political nature of the supply side, offers hypotheses as to why the two states imposed 
the legal land tenure institutions that they did. It suggests that the holders of Kenyan political power had 
more to gain from land-market activation than did their Rwandan corollaries. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Diese Arbeit untersucht ein Paradoxon, das in der Entwicklung von Bodenordnungssystemen im 
östlichen Afrika der spät- und postkolonialen Periode zu beobachten ist. Trotz des Versuchs des Staates 
Kenia, in seiner Zentralprovinz einen Bodenmarkt aufzubauen, blieben Transaktionen in diesem Bereich 
begrenzt; in Ruanda hingegen, das versuchte den Bodenmarkt einzuschränken, vervielfachten sich die 
Transaktionen. Diese Arbeit versucht nun das oben beschriebene Paradoxon mittels neo-
institutionalistischer Theorien über institutionellen Wandel zu untersuchen. Es ist anzunehmen, dass die 
neu eingeführten formellen Bodenrechte ihre gesetzten Ziele nicht erreichten, weil sie, im Gegensatz zu 
den bereits existierenden informellen Regeln, kaum in der Lage waren auf die Ansprüche der 
ökonomischen Akteure zu reagieren. Konzeptionelle Arbeit im Bereich der Neuen Institutionellen 
Ökonomie erklärt, warum informelle und formelle Institutionen der Bodenordnung nicht immer 
zusammen hängen. Weiterhin erläutert diese Arbeit die informellen Bodenbesitzinstitutionen anhand der 
zwei Fallstudien, indem sie zwei  Faktoren auf der Nachfrageseite,  (i) Bevölkerungsdichte und (ii) 
Kommerzialisierung der Landwirtschaft, in jedem Bereich untersucht. Es ist anzunehmen, dass 
Aktivitäten im Bereich des Bodenmarkts vergleichbar waren, weil in beiden Fällen ähnlicher Druck der 
Nachfrageseite vorhanden war. Die formellen Bodengesetze betreffend zieht die Arbeit die politische 
Natur der Angebotsseite in Betracht und stellt Hypothesen auf, welche die Frage behandeln, warum die 
beiden Staaten gerade diese Bodenordnungsinstitutionen einführten. Diese Arbeit kommt zu dem 
Schluß, dass die politischen Machtinhaber Kenias mehr aus der Aktivierung von Bodenmärkten zu 
gewinnen hatten als jene in Ruanda. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Land tenure in sub-Saharan Africa 
Land is the fundamental factor of production. For this reason, the conditions under 
which land is held and used can significantly affect the economic behaviour of a 
society. Different land tenure systems can lead to widely different economic 
outcomes; accordingly, it is difficult to overstate the importance of their study. 
However, it would be incorrect to say that land is equally important in all places at 
all times. The significance of land – and of the rules surrounding its ownership and 
use – is greater in pre-industrial, agrarian economies. For the most part, the 
importance of land for economic development dwindles as societies become 
industrial and post-industrial. 
It follows that land’s significance has not markedly diminished in areas that 
have remained predominantly agrarian. Land matters are still critically important 
for many of the developing economies of the Third World. Consider sub-Saharan 
Africa. Even with the rapid urbanisation of the later twentieth century, throughout 
its history the region has always been and continues to be comprised of agrarian 
economies. This paper is interested in the development and evolution of land tenure 
systems in Africa, an agrarian region past and present. 
Over the long term, the defining feature of land tenure in the history of sub-
Saharan Africa has been the region’s land abundance.1 Though there are important 
qualifications to be made, in economic terms pre-colonial Africa was marked by land 
abundance and – its upshot – labour scarcity. It was a relatively lightly peopled 
continent, a situation exacerbated but certainly not solely caused by pre-colonial 
external slave trades.2 Land abundance had profound implications for the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For background reading on this African story of land abundance, see Gareth Austin, ‘Resources, 
techniques, and strategies south of the Sahara: revising the factor endowments perspective on African 
economic development, 1500-2000’, Economic History Review 61:3 (2008), pp. 589-90; Anthony G. 
Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 11-27; John Iliffe, Africans: 
The History of a Continent, new edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1-5. 
2 Some argue that external slave trades were the reason Africa was underpopulated; see e.g. Patrick 
Manning, Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave Trades (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); Nathan Nunn, ‘The long-term effects of Africa’s slave trades’, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 123 (2008), pp. 139-76; Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: 
Bogle-L’Ouverture, 1972). However, the demographic data that exist for pre-colonial Africa are 
sparse, not very useful, and even reveal pre-slave-trade underpopulation, making this a difficult 
position to maintain; see Gareth Austin, ‘The “reversal of fortune” thesis and the compression of 
history: perspectives from African and comparative economic history’, Journal of International 
Development 20, p. 1001; Hopkins, West Africa, p. 17. 
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development of tenure systems. Without a scarcity value, there was little reason to 
have well-defined private property rights in land. Instead, land was usually held 
under systems of communal or free tenure. 
As elsewhere, this situation was apt to change: land abundance was a feature 
that would not last in perpetuity, and so property rights would eventually require 
redefinition. Especially during the twentieth century – but in some places, well 
before – the general situation of land abundance underwent major upheavals as 
populations grew larger and agricultural activities more commercialised. In many 
places, land abundance began to make way for land scarcity.3 That this shift usually 
began during the colonial period meant that the onus was often on colonial 
governments to respond to it. 
The ‘land question’ in Africa inspired different ‘solutions’ for different 
governments at different times.4 For some, individual property rights represented 
progress, and legally private tenure the most civilised way to deal with land.5 
Nineteenth-century European theories of property rights in land posited a unilineal 
path at the end of which was full private property, the implication being that the 
European approach to land ownership was the highest approach. This idea acquired 
certain personification in some of the larger figures of colonial African history: in 
British West Africa, Lieutenant-Colonel Rowe was a most notable proponent;6 later, 
in East Africa, Minister of Agriculture Swynnerton held a similar position.7 
Not all governments concurred, especially outside Anglophone Africa. If 
British administrators occasionally extolled the virtues of offering private property 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Land scarcity was therefore a ‘natural’ occurrence in some areas. In others, especially the British 
settler colonies, land was also made artificially scarce; see Gareth Austin, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: land 
rights and ethno-national consciousness in historically land-abundant economies’, in Stanley L. 
Engerman and Jacob Metzer (eds.), Land Rights, Ethno-Nationality, and Sovereignty in History (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 279; Sara Berry, ‘Debating the land question in Africa’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 44 (2002), p. 639. 
4 Catherine Boone, ‘Property and constitutional order: land tenure reform and the future of the 
African state’, African Affairs 106:425 (2007), pp. 560-566; John W. Bruce, ‘A perspective on indigenous 
land tenure systems and land concentration’, in S. P Reyna and R. E. Downs (eds.), Land and Society in 
Contemporary Africa (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1988), pp. 23-54. 
5 Frederick J. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and 
Sons, 1922), p. 280. 
6 Anne Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1989), pp. 120-3. 
7 R. J. M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya (Nairobi: 
Government Printer, 1954). 
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to the African peasantry, the continental powers were often loath to extend such a 
European ideal to their overseas subjects. And so, for those more wary of the 
negative effects that could come with the radical individualisation of thitherto-
communal systems, state-owned, indigenously governed land appeared a more 
attractive response. Strengthening and even reifying the existing indigenous systems 
of land tenure became a priority in the areas in which these policies were preferred. 
 The legacies of colonial land policies would imprint themselves upon the 
continent; even where radical land reforms eventually overturned them, these 
extreme ends of the policy spectrum would continue to shape the debate on land in 
Africa well into the present, and very imaginably beyond. 
 
The cases: land markets in Central Province in Kenya and Rwanda 
As stated above, the conditions under which land is held and used can affect the 
economic behaviour of an economy. The consequences that different land tenure 
systems have are especially great for agricultural productivity. Ostensibly, systems 
of private ownership are best for productivity: they increase tenure security for 
landholders, thereby making them more prone to invest in their holdings; they 
collateralise land, which in turn encourages the growth of rural credit necessary to 
fund investments; and they promote the development of markets in land.8 For the 
sake of feasibility, this paper focuses on this last point – the development of land 
markets – in two case studies in eastern Africa: (i) Central Province in Kenya; and (ii) 
Rwanda.9 The more individualised are land rights, the more land becomes a saleable 
commodity, and so the more active land markets should be. The cases invite 
comparison because they share similarities that should logically influence the 
evolution of land tenure systems: ecologically, both areas were fertile forested 
highlands;10 demographically, both were densely populated and grew all the more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Gershon Feder and Raymond Noronha, ‘Land rights systems and agricultural development in 
sub-Saharan Africa’, World Bank Research Observer 2 (1987), pp. 143-69; cf. Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘The 
evolutionary theory of land rights as applied to sub-Saharan Africa: a critique’, Development and 
Change 27 (1996), pp. 29-86. 
9 See Map 1 on the following page. 
10 Different factor endowments influence the development of property rights and land-tenure 
institutions. In Africa, the forest/savannah distinction is particularly important. For a case from the 
Americas, see Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, ‘Factor endowments, institutions, and 
differential paths of growth among New World economies: a view from economic historians of the 
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so (at continent-topping rates) as the twentieth century progressed.11 Systems of land 
tenure in colonial and post-colonial Kenya and Rwanda followed similar paths on 
the ground (de facto), but very different paths on the books (de jure). These 
differences require explanation. 
 Briefly, late-colonial and post-colonial land legislation in Kenya sought to 
activate land markets. It did this by introducing land registration and thus making 
land previously held under customary tenure a saleable commodity. By contrast, 
land legislation in Rwanda in the corresponding periods sought to arrest the 
development of land markets. It did this by introducing exceptionally prohibitive 
conditions for land transactions. 
 Land markets developed unevenly across Kenya. They grew quite active in 
the former areas of European settlement, where registration and titling had existed 
from the early-twentieth century.13 Conversely, in Central Province, the first area to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
United States’, in Stephen Haber (ed.), How Latin America Fell Behind (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 1997), pp. 260-304. 
11 Austin, ‘Land rights’, pp. 280-1. 
12 Constructed by the author from the freely licensed BlankMap-Africa.svg file accessible at 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f9/BlankMap-Africa.svg, last accessed 20 
June 2011; and the freely licensed Kenya_Provinces_Central.png file accessible at 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8d/Kenya_Provinces_Central.png, last 
accessed 20 June 2011. 
13 Shem E. Migot-Adholla, Peter Hazell, Benoît Blarel, and Frank Place, ‘Indigenous land rights 
systems in sub-Saharan Africa: a constraint on productivity?’, World Bank Economic Review 5:1 (1991), 
p. 170; Shem E. Migot-Adholla, Frank Place, and W. Oluoch-Kosura, ‘Security of tenure and land 
Map 1: Rwanda (left) and Central Province shown within Kenya (right)12 
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undergo and complete the late- and post-colonial land registration process, land 
markets remained constrained by customary law, particularly on the former Native 
Reserves.14 Even with titled, individual ownership, many landholders felt they were 
not free to sell their land without consulting their communities or kin groups.15 
Therefore, land markets in Central Province did not develop the way in which the 
architects of Kenyan land reform had hoped they would. 
 As for Rwanda, the land-transaction restrictions there could only be described 
as failures. Land markets developed in spite of the laws designed to limit them, and 
indeed the vast majority of land transactions in the post-colonial period did not meet 
the stringent criteria demanded by the legislation.16 Therefore, as in Central Province 
in Kenya, land markets in Rwanda did not follow the path envisioned by the 
country’s legislators. 
 Land-market activity in Central Province was not necessarily weaker than it 
was in Rwanda in absolute or even relative terms. The data available are inadequate 
to measure this with the most desirable precision, but Migot-Adholla et al. offer a 
provisional means through which land markets in Rwanda and Central province can 
be compared (see Table 1 on the following page). From surveys conducted in the late 
1980s, one can ascertain a far deal of variety in land-market activity within the two 
areas, but the levels of land-market activity were broadly similar. This similarity is 
intriguing because it is unexpected: the respective land laws of the countries would 
have predicted more purchases/sales in Central Province and fewer in Rwanda. What 
is especially interesting is that despite being one of the first areas of Kenya to 
undergo registration, Central Province’s land markets were more constrained than 
those found elsewhere in the country. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
productivity in Kenya’, in Shem E. Migot-Adholla and John W. Bruce (eds.), Searching for Land Tenure 
Security in Africa (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1994), pp. 119-40. 
14 Simon Coldham, ‘The effect of registration of title upon customary land rights in Kenya’, Journal 
of African Law 22 (1978), pp. 91-111; Migot-Adholla et al., ‘Indigenous land rights’, pp. 160-1; Thomas 
C. Pinckney, and Peter K. Kimuyu, ‘Land tenure reform in East Africa: good, bad, or unimportant?’, 
Journal of African Economies 3 (1994), p. 5. 
15 Shem E. Migot-Adholla and John W. Bruce, ‘Introduction: are indigenous African tenure systems 
insecure?’, in Shem E. Migot-Adholla and John W. Bruce (eds.), Searching for Land Tenure Security in 
Africa (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1994), pp. 1-13. 
16 Catherine André and Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘Land relations under unbearable stress: Rwanda 
caught in the Malthusian trap’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34 (1998), pp. 19-20; 
Benoît Blarel, ‘Tenure security and agricultural production under land scarcity: the case of Rwanda’, 
in John W. Bruce and Shem E. Migot-Adholla (eds.), Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa 
(Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1994), pp. 71-95. 
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 The story becomes all the more fascinating when one considers the subjective 
opinions of landholders in the two areas. Though actual activity surrounding land 
transactions may have been rather similar, when asked whether they felt they were 
entitled to transfer their land via the market, across the board landholders in Central 
Province indicated that they were very restricted when it came to using the market 
to sell or lease their holdings. This belied their legal rights: after all, these inhabitants 
held land titles. In Rwanda, recorded impressions indicate that these restrictions 
were not nearly as acutely perceived, despite the fact they were indeed severe: 
surveyed inhabitants were not even landholders per se, given that they did not – 
could not! – possess titles conferring something approaching ownership. 
 In the late- and post-colonial periods, Kenya and Rwanda differed in their 
land-market goals: the former attempted to encourage markets in land, the latter to 
discourage them. In Central Province in Kenya, as in Rwanda the country over, the 
objectives went largely unmet. Paradoxically, custom constrained land markets 
where land was legally made into a commodity, and markets emerged where legally 
most transactions were not permitted. This paper explores this paradox by 
considering the evolution of de jure and de facto land tenure systems through new 
institutionalist theories of institutional change. It argues that newly introduced 
formal land laws failed to achieve their land-market goals because they were less 
able to respond to the demands of economic actors than were the existing informal 
rules. From there, it moves to explain why land-market activity in the two areas was 
broadly similar, and why the two respective governments’ land-market goals were 
so different. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Adapted from Migot-Adholla et al., ‘Indigenous land rights’, p. 162. 
Table 1: Purchases as percentage of total land acquisitions (1987-1988)17 
Rwanda Ruhengeri 17.4 
 Butare 2.3 
 Gitarama 8.1 
Kenya (Central Province) Kianjogu 13.2 
 Mweiga 6.0 
Kenya (Elsewhere) Madzu 28.6 
 Luma-Kanda 26.0 
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Rationale 
Paradoxes often offer pre-packaged research questions, and the one observed in 
Kenyan and Rwanda land markets is no exception. Paradoxes of the like are the 
substance of good history – they allow the historian to move from merely recounting 
events to solving historical puzzles. 
 The piecing together of such puzzles can indeed be its own reward. When 
curiosities are piqued, one hardly needs a more profound motivation to attempt to 
satisfy them. The activity of getting lost in the minutiae of history and subsequently 
trying to find one’s way out can simply be interesting to the wanderer and require 
no greater impetus. If our wanderer is lucky, sorting through these travels and 
travails might results in compelling history, intriguing to others. 
 Should this present work succeed in accomplishing as much, that would be 
success enough. However, it would be foolish not to recognise that even the 
historical study of land is lent greater purpose when the subjects of inquiry are 
current agrarian economies. In such cases, history often blends and bleeds into the 
present. 
 Sub-Saharan Africa is both historically and presently an agrarian region. In 
the past decade, farming activities and livestock rearing have accounted for roughly 
60 per cent of African’s livelihoods.19 If one examines the contribution of the 
agricultural sector to gross domestic product (GDP), it is clear that sub-Saharan 
Africa (and the two countries that are the focus of this paper) can aptly be described 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Development Data Group, The World Bank. 2008. 2008 World Development Indicators Online. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40 
19 African Union, African Development Bank, and Economic Commission for Africa, ‘Framework 
and guidelines on land policy in Africa – Land policy in Africa: a framework to strengthen land 
rights, enhance productivity, and secure livelihoods’ (Addis Ababa: AUC-ECA-AfDB Consortium, 
2010), p. 7. 
Table 2: Percentage of GDP from agriculture18 
 1965 2005 
Developed Countries 5.0a 1.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 24.6 16.4 
Kenya 35.3 26.8 
Rwanda 74.8 41.0 
Notes: 
a: 1971 
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as agrarian, especially when compared with developed countries (see Table 2 on the 
previous page). 
 With such a sizeable proportion of GDP coming directly or indirectly from 
land, improving the productivity of agriculture (or of agricultural labour) can clearly 
make an agrarian economy richer. With such high levels of employment in 
agriculture, improving productivity can lead to increases in rural incomes and thus 
secure and improve rural livelihoods. Augmenting the productivity of land can also 
boost non-agricultural sectors by freeing more labour to engage in non-agricultural 
production. 
 The goal of this paper is not to prescribe which land tenure systems ought to 
be adopted or implemented in Rwanda and Central Province (or in Africa more 
generally), neither is it to reaffirm the positions of proponents of privatisation or 
leviathan policies, a debate-cum-false-dilemma populated by participants who have 
too often lost the ability to see in greyscale.20 Avoiding normative statements is not 
to concede that making the correct recommendations is impossible. Quite contrarily, 
this paper takes the position that, though they surely vary by context, the ‘right’ 
recommendations exist in principle and are discoverable. However, those who delve 
into the new institutionalist literature are cautioned to tread softly when it comes to 
prescribing institutional arrangements, especially if such arrangements are to be 
transplanted.21 And those who explore the land tenure literature know that the 
political and economic contexts of certain countries’ land tenure systems provide 
enough twine to disentangle on their own, to say nothing of the social and cultural 
contexts, which can include nuanced relationships between land and spirituality, 
land and gender relations, and land and marginalised groups.22 Erring on the side of 
caution, this paper instead treads not at all. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 The facile idea that the “only way” to deal effectively with a common pool resource such as land 
is either through the freest of markets or biggest of states has been opposed by Nobel laureate Elinor 
Ostrom throughout her career. See e.g. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: the Evolution of 
Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 8-15; Elinor 
Ostrom, ‘Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems’ – Prize 
Lecture (2009). 
21 Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson, ‘Institutional stickiness and the new 
development economics’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67:2, pp. 331-58. 
22 Regrettably, for want of space this paper pays short shrift to social and cultural contexts, though 
much promising work is being done in this area. 
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 So, what is the point of researching land tenure systems and land markets if 
not to offer prescriptions as to how they might be improved? This is a fair question, 
and indeed it is agreed here that the long-term purpose of land tenure research 
ought ultimately to be to inform policy and help ensure the ‘right’ land tenure 
institutions are chosen and supported. However, before that long-term purpose can 
be fruitfully engaged with, there remains a significant amount of legwork to be 
done. 
 Development economists, governments (both colonial and independent), and 
a gamut of non-state actors have long acknowledged the importance of 
appropriately dealing with land issues in agrarian regions like sub-Saharan Africa. 
Yet, land reform efforts in the region have often proven dissatisfactory in terms of 
raising agricultural productivity and allowing for equitable distributions of land. As 
a consequence, land policy remains high on the agenda of many, including a number 
of prominent international organisations. In 2010, the African Union (AU), African 
Development Bank (AfDB), and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) released a publication entitled ‘Framework and guidelines on land policy 
in Africa’.23 Recognised therein is that one of the greatest impediments to effective 
land policy implementation is a lack of baseline data and carefully conducted 
research.24 Similar lamentations have been made elsewhere. The goal of this paper is 
to make a modest contribution to the expanding knowledge base on land in Africa, 
and it will do so by situating itself in the new institutionalist literature, which has 
been making insightful inroads in this area. The paradox noticed in the development 
of land markets in Rwanda and Central Province offers the historian a pre-packaged 
research question, but further, the exploration of this research question can yield 
fruits ripe for the picking by policymakers and development economists. Indeed, 
any opportunity to gain historical perspective into contemporary development 
issues should always be emphatically welcomed. The historical approach offered by 
the paper aims to complement a diverse set of research initiatives in this area, which 
ideally will include comprehensive data collection, sociological research, legal 
research, as well as the contributions from many other fields. In sum, the hope of the 
broader research agenda is eventually to put together a comprehensive picture of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 AU, AfDB, ECA, ‘Framework and guidelines on land policy in Africa’. 
24 Ibid., p. 32. 
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land tenure systems throughout space and time with which policymakers can best 
inform themselves as they design land policy implementation strategies, action 
plans, and even legislation. So while this paper soberly avoids making normative 
statements and prescriptions, it is emboldened by the underlying assumption that 
correct prescriptions can be made. 
 
Plan 
This paper is arranged in two parts. The first part is largely narrative and aims to set 
the scene. It contains two chapters, the first of which covers the history of land in 
Central Province in Kenya, the second of land in Rwanda. The focus of the 
discussion is the late- and post-colonial periods of both countries. However, the 
discussion stretches further back as necessary. A briefer time span would risk 
creating the impression that land tenure systems in the two cases were static until 
the watersheds occurring from the mid-twentieth century. Each chapter of the first 
part thus presents the history of land tenure and land reform in the particular case, 
describing first the pre- and early-colonial circumstances and changes, and then 
honing in on this paper’s focus: land tenure and land markets in the late- and post-
colonial periods. 
 The second part presents more of an analytical tract, digging deeper into the 
late- and post-colonial land tenure systems and reforms described in the previous 
part. It is organised into four chapters. The first of these justifies the use of the new 
institutional economics (NIE) as a theoretical framework for this paper’s analysis. It 
does so by responding to an objection that may be levied against the applicability of 
the new institutionalism in African economic history. With the potential objection 
settled, the next chapter moves to present more thoroughly the heuristic devices this 
paper uses in its analysis: the new institutionalist concepts of induced institutional 
innovation (III) and the evolutionary theory of land rights (ELTR).25 The analysis 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 It should be noted at this point that there have been a number of historical tests of the theory of 
induced institutional innovation. A preliminary list of these includes: Gareth Austin, Labour, Land and 
Capital in Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante, 1807-1956 (Rochester: University of Rochester 
Press, 2005) on Asante; David Feeny, ‘Competing hypotheses of underdevelopment: a Thai case 
study’, The Journal of Economic History 39 (1979), pp. 113-27 on Thailand; Yuijiro Hayami and Masao 
Kikuchi, Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads: An Economic Approach to Institutional Change 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982); and Kikuchi and Hayami, ‘Inducements to 
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treats land tenure systems, both de facto and de jure, as institutions in an attempt to 
understand how they change over time. The third chapter in this part analyses the 
demand side of land tenure innovations in late- and post-colonial Central Province 
and Rwanda, the fourth chapter the supply side. Respectively, the three final 
chapters in this analytical part endeavour to explain the three key problems this 
paper’s paradox poses: (i) why gulfs emerged between the informal and formal land 
tenure institutions of the cases; (ii) why informal institutions produced similar levels 
of land-market activity in Rwanda and Central Province; and (iii) why formal 
institutions favoured the activation of land markets in Central Province more than 
they did in Rwanda. 
 The final chapter summarises and concludes. 
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PART I: HISTORY 
 
CHAPTER ONE: CENTRAL PROVINCE, KENYA 
Pre- and early-colonial periods 
As was the general story in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, land in Kenya was 
abundant, and labour relatively scarce. This was true even of those most hospitable 
and populated locales: the fertile Kikuyuland (later Central Province) was a much 
more attractive area for human settlement than the semi-arid and arid stretches near 
to which it lay, but prior to the colonial period land shortages never posed a 
problem.26 An effective system of land governance had spontaneously emerged in 
Kikuyu society: plots were managed, held, and acquired under the aegis of social 
units (singular: mbari) headed by a prominent elder, but land rights were easy to 
acquire for outsiders (as a common example: in exchange for labour to help clear 
new land). The phenomenon of landlessness was thus unprecedented, as even those 
without proper rights to cultivate land could gain access and use rights. 
 Though natural population growth would later play a part in upturning land-
labour factor ratios in Kikuyuland, it was an exogenous force that caused the first 
real breaking point. The situation of land abundance met a shock with the area’s 
incorporation into the British Empire in the late-nineteenth century. Over the next 
decades, a series of colonial policies and initiatives would hasten the crowding of 
central Kenya. 
For the British, eastern Africa teemed with possibilities, both economic and 
strategic. But for many imperialists, these possibilities were unrealisable if the region 
were to remain unequipped with the proper infrastructure. Whether motivated by 
commerce27 or control,28 the British decided to finance the construction of a railway 
from the Indian Ocean at Mombasa to Lake Victoria in what would later become 
Uganda. If it helped the British secure the source of the Nile and maintain dreams of 
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26 Robert H. Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: the Political Economy of Class and Economic Change 
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a Cairo-to-Cape-Town sphere of influence in eastern and southern Africa, the 
railway was nevertheless enormously costly. This did not sit easily with frugality-
minded Victorian Britain, the disdainful murmurs of which beckoned redress. The 
decision to construct the railway thus left the British colonial government with a 
challenging task: making it profitable.29 
One chosen solution was the promotion of Kenya as an area of European 
settlement in Africa. It was thought that a sizeable European community on the 
railway line could act as an economic palliative for a project that was bleeding 
money. Farmers would grow crops for global markets and purchase British 
manufactures; in providing the necessary transport infrastructure for both ends, the 
existence of the railway would be vindicated. The idea was sensible enough in 
theory, however it overlooked a crucial detail: Kenya was not as naturally attractive 
a destination for Europeans as were Britain’s two southern African settler colonies, 
South Africa and Rhodesia.30 In order to entice prospective settlers to relocate to 
Kenya, the colonial government needed to engineer an inviting economic climate. To 
this end, the best agricultural land was alienated for Europeans and offered at low 
prices. 
The colonial government laid the foundations for a legal framework that 
allowed the state to alienate native Kenyans from their land, and subsequently 
permitted European settlers to acquire legally the best land made available from this 
alienation process.31 The relevant enactments relegated the Kikuyu to land on Native 
Reserves in what would become Central Province as Europeans took root on what 
became known as the White Highlands. 
While the process of estranging Kikuyu from the Highlands certainly left 
European settlers with a wealth of high-potential land at their disposal, it did not 
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29 Paul Collier and Deepak Lal, Labour and Poverty in Kenya: 1900-1980 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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leave them with the means to realise this potential. Land, of course, is a necessary 
but insufficient ingredient in agricultural production: the settlers faced a situation of 
land abundance and labour scarcity.32 In order to make their agricultural endeavours 
viable, it was hastily realised that they would require African labour. Settlers thus 
traded land access and use rights for African labour obligations. This created a 
scenario of migrant labour that was generally positive for both the settlers and 
Kikuyu involved throughout the early years of the arrangement.33 
This agreeable situation was not to last, changing abruptly in the 1920s and 
1930s. Population growth and land concentration on the Native Reserves led to more 
Kikuyu leaving the Reserves to seek land and employment as migrant labourers (or 
as squatters, in the parlance of the day). On the settler farms, rising commodity 
prices encouraged European landholders to enter mixed farming. This required 
more land and labour, so squatter plots shrank in size, and labour obligations 
ballooned.34 Owing more labour for less land on the settlers’ farms spurred labour 
migrants to go back to the Reserves. However, return migrants were met with a 
dispiriting homecoming: during their absence, the situation on the Reserves had also 
worsened considerably. 
Squatters attempting to return to the Native Reserves encountered a situation 
of land scarcity in which land rights had become harder to reacquire (or, as was 
often the case, acquire for the first time). Population pressure and the growing 
commercialisation of agriculture on the Reserves made those with land there seek to 
limit access to land.35 The acquisition of land rights became increasingly restricted, 
even to members of kin groups.36 Landlessness, unheard-of before the arrival of 
settlers, was now very real and growing. As early as 1930, there were more than 
thirty thousand landless squatters.37 
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34 Ibid., p. 178. 
35 M. P. Cowen and R. W. Shenton, ‘Development doctrine in Africa: the case of Kenya’, in M. P. 
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Troubles on the Native Reserves were further aggravated by colonial 
agricultural policies. Africans were not permitted to grow cash crops, for settlers 
could not compete with local production. This was because many of the cash crops 
(such as coffee) did not benefit from economies of scale; large-scale settler 
agriculture did not have any comparative advantage over small-scale African 
farms.38 African farmers were thus barred from producing those crops in which they 
could be most competitive. Instead, they could only engage in farming activities 
either as subsistence agriculturalists, or as disadvantaged competitors in selected 
commercial agriculture endeavours. 
Hence, the situations of both the Africans on the Native Reserves and those 
squatting on the settler farms had degenerated significantly by the 1950s. 
Landlessness, peasant immiseration and rural disgruntlement blistered apace, 
ultimately combining to explode into the Mau Mau Rebellion, a Kikuyu-led anti-
colonial revolt.39 The leaders of Mau Mau demanded greater African representation 
in the governance of the colony, and, at heart, greater living conditions for the 
impoverished, landless masses. Demands initially went largely unheeded, the 
British confident that their own military superiority would preclude any viable 
uprising. However, it was not long before the disenfranchisement engendered 
violence, which soon resulted in European casualties. Fearful now for their own 
security, British apprehensions grew to match the severity of the situation. In 1952, a 
state of emergency was declared in Kenya. 
 
Late- and post-colonial periods 
Faced with the emergency, the British colonial government had to respond. One 
arena of response was in the thitherto-prohibitive agricultural policies. From 1935, 
the government had already begun to allow elite African farmers to plant coffee, and 
restrictions were further eased from 1946 in order to take advantage of the post-war 
coffee boom.40 Central Kenya still faced these restrictions, however, until coffee 
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production was expanded in an effort to appease revolutionaries and to counter the 
insurgencies of the Mau Mau Rebellion. 
Through a mix of politicking of the like and – to be sure – force, the British 
were ultimately victorious against the Mau Mau insurrection, formally quelling the 
uprising in 1956. But the spectre of Mau Mau, and the threat of a new incarnation of 
it, lent urgency to deal further with the land problems that helped ignite the 
Rebellion in the first place. It was acknowledged that only the initial steps had been 
taken, and that sweeping changes to colonial land policy were the way forward if 
peasant livelihoods were to be improved. 
Accordingly, there was also a more critical post-Rebellion response that 
involved land reforms. There were two types of land reform: the first involved the 
individualisation (via consolidation, registration, and provision of ownership) of 
land on the former Native Reserves of Central Province, an intended effect being the 
appeasement of those with rights in land. The second involved the selling of 
European-owned land to Africans, which was in part meant to combat landlessness. 
This second type of land reform is important and shall be revisited later. It is, 
however, the first type of land reform that is this paper’s main focus.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the late- and post-colonial governments of Kenya 
introduced radical land reform policies designed to expand imported forms of 
private tenure.41 The conversion to private tenure, as envisaged by Minister of 
Agriculture Swynnerton in his eponymous 1954 plan, was expected to lead to 
greater agricultural productivity,42 in so doing enriching the landed Kikuyu enough 
to the point that revolution no longer seemed in their best interests. Swynnerton 
suggested that private tenure would help Central Province improve productivity by 
providing landholders greater access to credit (with land as collateral), by promoting 
investment in improvements (through greater land security), and through the 
creation of well-functioning markets in land. Therefore, one of the key goals of the 
Swynnerton Plan and of subsequent colonial and post-colonial land legislation was 
to encourage active land markets.43 
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The recommendations of the Swynnerton Plan were pursued after the Mau 
Mau Rebellion had been formally put down. The Native Lands (Registration) 
Ordinance entered into law in 1959, and the post-independence government later 
expanded its provisions with the Registration of Titles Act in 1963. However, despite 
a legal framework designed to facilitate them, land markets in Kenya would not 
develop evenly across the country in the post-colonial period. Especially in the 
former Native Reserves of Central Kenya, well-functioning land markets did not 
clearly emerge.44 Instead, customary law continued to dictate the way in which most 
inhabitants dealt with land, even where landholdings were largely registered.45 
Indeed, indigenous values were apt to persist in the face of national land reform 
legislation, as many landholders continued to feel as though they were not 
permitted to sell their titled land without the approval of their families and kin 
groups.46 This likely had much to do with the fact that, despite registration, 
fragmentation of land continued to occur, and many people still acquired access 
rights to land – even though these rights were absent from the register.47 
The land tenure situation in post-colonial Kenya emerged from a history of 
settler colonialism and resultant violent conflict. As tensions came to a head, the 
colonial government introduced private-property rights in land through 
registration, a policy whole-heartedly accepted by the post-colonial government. Yet 
the inhabitants of central Kenya continued to behave as though land was not a fully 
saleable, privately owned commodity. The de jure and de facto tenure systems of 
post-colonial Central Province were not one and the same. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RWANDA
Pre- and early-colonial periods 
It was noted that there were important qualifications to the general situation of pre-
colonial land abundance in sub-Saharan Africa. Rwanda was one of those 
qualifications. In the late-nineteenth century, German colonial officials recognised 
the area that would become known as Rwanda as one of the most densely populated 
parts of the continent, even if their population estimates were subsequently found to 
be exaggerated.48 Later inquiries found the basic claim of high population density to 
be robust, and further investigations into the longer demographic history of the area 
would reveal historic population levels befitting of modern Africa’s most densely 
populated country. ‘Lightly-peopled’ may have been an appropriate descriptor for 
pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa in general, but not so for Rwanda in particular.49 
The forested hills of Rwanda offered a natural endpoint for many of the 
frontiersmen of Africa’s prehistory: a confluence of factors not easily disentangled 
(e.g. precipitation levels, elevation, fertility of soil) produced an area less hostile to 
human life and settlement than the jungles or savannahs elsewhere in surrounding 
locations. Patterns of pre-colonial settlement duly reflected as much. Later in the 
pre-colonial period, the rate of population growth appears to have accelerated. 
Indirect indices such as the clearance of new lands, and the emergence of new tenure 
arrangements reveal that the Rwandan population was rising during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.50 This growth resulted from two distinct phenomena: 
firstly, from migrations from the northwest; secondly – and indeed especially – from 
the adoption of new higher-yield cultigens.51 
Faced with the pressures of exceptional population growth, ways of life and 
patterns of behaviour in pre-colonial Rwanda could not remain static. Dramatic 
social and land-tenure-related changes ensued in the nineteenth century, and these 
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played out in an arena in which ethnic and social identities had been growing 
progressively more salient. Increasing land scarcity led to uburetwa,52 a land 
arrangement through which the demographically weaker Tutsi pastoralists enserfed 
the majority Hutu agriculturalists.53 The Tutsi had previously come to possess vast 
swathes of land to accommodate their large cattle holdings, usually through the 
expropriation of land from the Hutu.54 This had resulted in the swelling of Hutu 
landlessness, and so emerged uburetwa, a system of patron-client relationships 
between the landed Tutsi and landless Hutu, to accommodate the growing landless 
contingent and to enrich further Tutsi aristocratic lineages. The arrangement 
compelled the Hutu to provide bound labour services, agricultural produce, and 
certain goods (typically beer) in order to receive access to land. It should be noted 
that insofar as there were also landless Tutsi in pre-colonial Rwanda, they were 
exempt from subjugation under uburetwa. This was the system in place on the eve of 
the first European incursion into the area. 
German colonialists were the first Europeans in Ruanda-Urundi (the 
historical entity referring to modern-day Rwanda and Burundi), and as they lost 
their African possessions in the wake of World War I, Belgium assumed formal 
control of the territory in 1924.55 Both German and Belgian rule meddled little with 
the existing land tenure arrangements that had developed in pre-colonial Rwanda. 
The Germans introduced private ownership of land, but the scale was minute, 
applicable only to the possessions of a few German missionaries. While a cursory 
glance at the laws of Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian control would indicate a more 
proactive approach, this would be misleading. Most Belgian land policies were first 
concocted for the neighbouring Belgian Congo, to be applied later to Ruanda-
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Urundi.56 However, colonial land policy in the Congo centred on mineral wealth and 
mining concessions, and so its application to land in Ruanda-Urundi was much 
more a matter of legal convenience than it was of practical utility. In keeping with 
this disposition toward the convenient, the Belgians left the vast majority of land in 
the country to be governed by customary law, upheld the Tutsi-dominated tenure 
system, and indeed ruled indirectly through Tutsi elites, to the social and economic 
detriment of the Hutu majority.57 Land relations in Rwanda would change little 
throughout the greater part of the colonial experience: uburetwa continued unabated 
for decades. This arrangement would last until the twilight of the era of Belgian rule. 
 
Late- and post-colonial periods 
In 1959, social relations in Rwanda changed drastically as the Hutu Revolution 
ended Tutsi hegemony.58 This revolution warrants some elaboration, as it set the 
stage for all developments – including those surrounding land relations – in Rwanda 
in the post-colonial period. In broad terms the revolt was waged as a response to 
ostensible Tutsi privilege and Hutu hardship, but more concretely the basis for the 
revolution was a push for majority voting under Belgian rule, the result of which 
would naturally benefit the Hutu-heavy population. Indeed, the Tutsi-headed 
political landscape in Rwanda prior to the revolution meant that some eighty per 
cent of the population faced political exclusion and few if any opportunities to 
participate in governance.59 The idea of revolution thus naturally held appeal for 
Rwanda’s majority ethnic group. But it also appealed to the Europeans present in 
Rwanda – especially the white Catholic clergy – who played a large part in assisting 
(some would say ‘engineering’) the revolution.60 While the reasons revolution 
garnered European support were plentiful, a particularly strong motivator was 
dissatisfaction with the prevailing system of land relations in the colony. In essence a 
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relic of pre-colonial social and class relations, and perhaps too reminiscent of the 
then long-discarded feudal systems of Europe, uburetwa had begun to be seen as 
economically inefficient by the Europeans present in Rwanda.61 A cash economy had 
been developing in the colony from the late-colonial period, largely a result of the 
Belgians’ desire to profit from their colonial possessions during the Second World 
War. Uburetwa seemed to the Europeans to preclude the optimal functioning of this 
cash economy, a goal that would be better achieved by social structures that 
favoured the majority Hutu agriculturalists. In short, the Hutu Revolution was 
championed by both Hutu and Belgian alike. 
In the period of violence following the revolution (typically perioditised in 
the literature from the official overthrow in 1959 to colonial withdrawal in 1962), the 
Tutsi faced pogroms, exile, and were for the most part successfully defended against 
when those in exile attempted to return. For their part, the Tutsi that remained in 
Rwanda were subsequently shut out of the political and economic processes of the 
country, the Belgian colonial government supporting the emergence of Hutu 
dominance. With the earlier years of colonialism in Ruanda-Urundi as a vantage 
point, this was a revirement de situation to say the least. Apropos land relations, the 
final land law of the colonial era was passed, deep in the throes of revolution, in 
1960: it formally ended the quasi-feudal system of land tenure that the Tutsis had 
dominated, and with the exception of the few parcels held under private tenure, 
rendered all land in the area property of the state.62 Though formally belonging to 
the state, most land was still technically governed under the aegis of customary 
tenure. The key difference was that now Hutu elites, rather than Tutsis, held control 
of land, and no patron-client system arose to replace the disposed uburetwa. Also of 
note was that any inhabitant wishing to transfer their customary holdings required 
state approval. 
Independence came to Rwanda in 1962.63 A Hutu government headed the 
independent republic, a legacy of the late-colonial revolution. In regards to land 
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tenure systems, the transition to independence represented no watershed, as the 
post-colonial government accepted the land laws it had inherited. This was to be 
expected, as the major changes to land relations that a Hutu government may have 
sought – namely the removal of uburetwa and the successful jockeying for Hutu land 
privileges – had already been delivered with the revolution. 
Moving forward, land as a legal entity in Rwanda was not dynamic. The issue 
of land rarely came up as a legal issue in the first decades of independent Rwanda, 
and when it did, ‘reform’ was not on the agenda. The only post-colonial legislation 
concerning land tenure in Rwanda was passed in 1976.64 This law reaffirmed and 
intensified restrictions placed on the operation of land markets. Conditions on sales 
and purchases became fixed: one could only sell one’s land rights if, after the 
transaction, the seller would retain a minimum of two hectares of land; conversely, 
one could only buy land rights if, after the transaction, the buyer would not come to 
possess more than two hectares. In land-scarce Rwanda, a place noted for its high 
density in the early years of European presence, these minimum-possession 
conditions were decidedly anti-land-market, and very few landholders fulfilled 
them.65 Indeed, in 1984, the countrywide average size of a landholding was only 1.2 
hectares.66 The story of scarcity was even more extreme in certain areas: half a 
decade later, in a study of one of Rwanda’s mille collines, it was found that the 
average size of a landholding was less than half of a hectare.67  
Even with a legal framework designed to restrict them, land markets 
developed at a quick pace in the post-colonial period. Research based on 1988 farm 
surveys revealed that land purchases were increasing over time, and that customary 
land tenure systems had largely evolved toward individualisation.68 Despite a lack 
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of land registration and the severe restrictions on land sales, over sixty per cent of 
the farmers surveyed felt fully entitled to land rights, including the right to sell their 
holdings.69 The land laws could indeed be extremely ineffectual: every sale of land 
observed in one case study was illegal according to the criteria of the 1976 
legislation.70 
The land tenure situation in post-colonial Rwanda grew out of the outcomes 
of the late-colonial Hutu Revolution. The quasi-feudal uburetwa system was 
removed, but nearly all land was made the legal property of the state. The post-
colonial situation trended toward greater control over land, as land markets became 
ever more legally restricted in the 1970s. This did not, however, stop informal land 
rights from becoming privatised and saleable, nor did it stop an informal land 
market from sprouting. As with Central Province in Kenya, a chasm existed between 
Rwanda’s de jure and de facto tenure systems. 
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70 André and Platteau, ‘Land relations’, pp. 19-20. 
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PART TWO: ANALYSIS
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE SUBSTANTIVIST OBJECTION 
It was announced in the introduction that the paradox noticed in land markets in 
Central Province and Rwanda would be analysed using concepts from the new 
institutional economics. While it is hoped that the discussion demonstrates how 
fruitful the new institutionalism can be when it comes to understanding land 
matters, a task of the first order is to justify the approach. 
While this paper is unable to follow every issue that its subjects present,71 
some of these announce themselves strongly enough to warrant comment. Land 
markets did not develop strongly in Central Province, and seemingly at a cost to 
economic efficiency – at least according to the architects of Kenyan land reform. If 
landholders were not acting as efficiently as possible, even with a legal framework 
designed to facilitate such efficiency, then temptations might predictably arise to bat 
that ball of thread so familiar in African economic history: economic anthropology’s 
substantivism versus formalism debate. Within this debate lies a potential objection 
to using the new institutional economics to organise the analysis. 
 
Formalism vs. Substantivism 
It is uncontroversial that, much to the chagrin of some economists, the arena in 
which economic behaviour unfurls is not a vacuum, but rather, an unremittingly 
cultural context – a plenum of culture. At least that much is fact. But from this fact, a 
key question of economic history generally emerges: does culture affect economic 
behaviour? The negative answer – ‘No, culture does not affect economic behaviour’ 
– tends to posit the universality of economically rational behaviour. As the 
perspective goes, actors in the economic sphere may indeed make different decisions 
based on their circumstances and cultural environments, but at base all actors are 
rational and so, ceteris paribus, they should make the same decisions. 
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71 For instance, the idea that rational-choice political economic approaches to history should be 
reserved for analyses of the locales from which they spawned. Some suggest that NIE is too 
inherently Eurocentric a theory for the study of African, and indeed any non-Western, economic 
histories. See Gareth Austin, ‘Reciprocal comparison and African history: tackling conceptual 
Eurocentrism in the study of Africa’s economic past’, African Studies Review 50:3 (2007), pp. 3-5; more 
generally see Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). For want of space, this paper cannot address these 
criticisms. 
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 At the other end of the spectrum, the affirmative answer – ‘Yes, culture affects 
economic behaviour’ – posits the historicity (rather than universality) of economically 
rational behaviour. Though a tendency to behave according to economic rationality 
may be observable in some capitalist societies, such a tendency is far from the 
‘default setting’, according to this perspective. In the pre-capitalist societies of pre-
colonial Africa (and, extending this further, any society in which economically 
rational behaviour is not blatantly on display), economic behaviour is heavily 
‘embedded’ in culture. That is, culture’s influence on economic behaviour is 
inestimably large. 
 These rival perspectives both achieved a great level of sophistication in the 
African economic historiographical tradition.72 The economically rational/market-
based perspective has come to be known as the formalist perspective. In global 
economic history, this perspective can at the very least be traced as far back to Adam 
Smith, who noted the human tendency to ‘truck and barter’.73 If Smith were correct, 
people would have reason to at least use economic rationality as a starting point for 
observations of behaviours across time and space. Market-focused economic 
historiography of Africa began in the 1950s with K. O. Dike’s doctoral thesis on the 
political economy of pre- and early-colonial Nigeria.74 This work might aptly be 
described as the genesis of the rational-choice tradition as applied to sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 The other pole has acquired the name of the substantivist perspective, and it 
has been most thoroughly developed in the African context by Karl Polanyi, George 
Dalton, and Paul Bohannan. Substantivists argued that economically rational 
behaviour, though observable in certain societies, is specific to capitalist societies – 
therefore expounding economic rationality’s historicity, and arguing against its 
universality. This does not mean that substantivists denied the existence of market 
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72
!It is worth noting that, rival though they were, they were both borne of the era of African 
decolonisation (that is, during the 1950s and 1960s). For historians of Africa, especially pro-nationalist 
ones, this was a time during which showing that ‘Africa had a history’ ranked high on the research 
agenda. Proponents of both perspectives attempted to illuminate Africa’s longer-term history, though 
in radically different ways.!
73 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in R. H. Campbell, A. S. 
Skinner, W.B. Todd (eds.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976 [originally published 1776]).  
74 K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). 
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places in pre-capitalist societies;75 rather, they suggested that markets were merely 
peripheral to economic life. 
 This poses a potential large objection to this paper’s approach to the 
Kenya/Rwanda land-market paradox. The new institutional economics being an 
outgrowth of neoclassical economics, it accepts economic rationality and utility 
maximisation among its foundations. However, if the substantivist perspective is 
correct and more useful in terms of explaining land-market behaviour in Central 
Province, then the basis of this paper’s analysis is potentially flawed. As such, the 
‘substantivist objection’ is one to which a response is absolutely required. Before 
moving to address the land-market behaviour noticed in twentieth-century Central 
Province in particular, let us begin by examining the record of the substantivist 
school in sub-Saharan Africa’s economic history in general. 
 
Formalism vs Substantivism: Pre-Colonial Africa 
Karl Polanyi and Paul Bohannan and George Dalton are responsible for the key 
works of the substantivist school,76 and much of their work has included 
examinations of African societies. Polanyi examined prices in Dahomey (the 
territory of which approximated that of modern Bénin) and concluded that, despite 
its ports that teemed with commerce and trade, Dahomey could not appropriately 
be described as a market economy: prices were fixed by the rulers; they were not set 
by the forces of supply and demand.77 Such a price-setting system is antithetical to 
the economic rationality of a market economy. 
 Bohannan and Dalton, for their part, observed a number of ‘special-purpose’ 
currencies in Africa and subsequently conceptualised pre-colonial African societies 
as segmented into limited “spheres of exchange”.78 For them, a ‘general purpose’ 
currency is the hallmark of a market economy, for it serves to facilitate exchange of 
different commodities and even different factors. If the only currencies of sub-
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75 To be sure, such an assertion would have severely discredited their position. 
76 Indeed, Polanyi could be considered the godfather of substantivist, with one of his works the 
foundational text: Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Times (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944). 
77 Karl Polanyi and Abraham Rotstein, Dahomey and the Slave Trade: An Analysis of an Archaic 
Economy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966). 
78 Paul Bohannan and George Dalton, Markets in Africa (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1962). 
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Saharan Africa were ‘special-purpose’ (i.e. could only be used in the acquisition of a 
single type of good or a very limited range of goods), then this, as with Polanyi’s 
observation of price setting, would not be indicative of a market economy. 
 These positions regarding the behaviour of price behaviour and currencies in 
Africa did not sit well with those of the formalist school. But among the merits of 
these propositions were that they were in principal testable and, therefore, 
falsifiable. Those wishing to test the substantivist proposition of unwavering prices 
needed only to ask ‘Were nominal prices in pre-colonial Africa indeed stable?’ If 
empirical evidence indicated they were not, then Polanyi’s argument that prices 
were fixed either by command or custom is falsified. Similarly, regarding currencies, 
a formalist could ask whether the commodity currencies of Africa (e.g. cowries and 
gold dust) were used as facilitators of exchange as in a market economy, or if they 
were truly confined to limited spheres of exchange, as in the substantivist view. 
 Typically succeeding their substantivist antagonists by years if not decades, 
formalists in the African economic history tradition often had the advantage of 
greater empirical evidence from which to draw. And so, on the strength of more 
robust data, they: overturned Polanyi’s description of price-setting in Dahomey, 
finding instead that nominal prices fluctuated in accordance with supply and 
demand;79 discovered that most West African currencies alleged to be ‘special-
purpose’ were in fact ‘general-purpose’;80 and, perhaps most notably, even 
uncovered linguistic evidence to prove that pre-colonial African societies had 
vocabularies necessary for the conceptual categories to think in economically 
rational ways.81 
The explanatory power of the substantivist approach to African economic 
history was eroded by successive formalist publications. When Anthony G. Hopkins 
put together his comprehensive formalist account of West African history and pre-
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79 Robin Law, ‘Posthumous questions for Karl Polanyi: price inflation in pre-colonial Dahomey’, 
Journal of African History 33:3 (1992), pp. 387-420. 
80 A. J. H. Latham, ‘Currency, credit and capitalism on the Cross River in the pre-colonial era’, 
Journal of African History 12:4 (1971), pp. 599-605. 
81 Michele D. Wagner, ‘Trade and Commercial Attitudes in Burundi before the Nineteenth Century’, 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 26:1 (1993), pp. 149-66. Formalists also dug up 
intriguing primary sources to support this claim. A most notable one was an Asante-language 
dictionary compiled by a Swiss missionary: it even included an entry for ‘capital’. See Austin, Labour, 
Land, and Capital, p. 135. 
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history in the 1970s,82 it sounded the knell for substantivist primacy in economic 
anthropology. Substantivism, despite its great contributions to advancing the 
debate, had its place rather conclusively and irreversibly usurped; it was no longer 
tenable as a mainstream opinion, because while it boasted impressive conceptual 
backing, it did not have the empirical robustness to match.  
 
Formalism vs. Substantivism: Land in Twentieth-Century Central Province? 
The preceding reply to the substantivist objection might strike the reader as 
superfluous in the context of this paper: if the substantivist position primarily 
informed the debate on pre-colonial (and pre-capitalist!) African economic history, 
and even then was ultimately discarded in favour for the formalist position, how 
could the substantivist position possibly pose a real objection to using a market-
economy approach to late- and post-colonial central Kenya? Whether or not 
imperialism had been the destroyer of pre-capitalist modes of production and ways 
of life, capitalism had clearly arrived, and agriculturalists very often produced for 
the market. 
It cannot be denied that Central Province had met market forces by the late-
colonial and post-independence periods that are the subject of this paper. The 
market mechanism was certainly alive and well. However, the substantivists had not 
not been put to bed just yet: there could still be important qualifications to be made, 
and land figured among them. George Dalton, an aforementioned member of the 
substantivist school, observed in the 1950s and 1960s that in “tribal Africa, products 
[were] frequently marketed, but factors almost never”.83 This is to say, the fruits of 
one’s labour, land, or capital may certainly enter the market and be exchanged 
according to the laws of supply and demand and scarcity, but one’s labour, land, or 
capital themselves tended to enjoy a certain isolation from these forces. 
 A foundational description of land relations in 1930s sub-Saharan Africa, 
deemed representative of Kikuyu society in Kenya even in the 1960s and beyond, 
reveals this isolation: 
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82 Hopkins, West Africa. 
83 He also quite poignantly states that “Indigenous market exchange in Africa might better be called 
market-place exchange to point up the absence of labor and land markets”. George Dalton, 
‘Traditional production in primitive African economies’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 76:3 (1962), pp. 
365, 373. 
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Every household-head has an exclusive right to land for building his home 
and for cultivation. Generally he can take up such land for himself within the 
area controlled by his sub-chief or headman, provided that he does not 
encroach upon land already occupied or cultivated by others. Failing this, it is 
the duty of his headman to provide him gratuitously with as much land as he 
needs… He also has the right, subject to the approval of his headman, to give 
away part of it to a relative or friend, or to lend it to someone else. But he can 
never sell it or dispose of it in any other way in return for material 
considerations. Should he finally abandon the spot, his land reverts to the 
tribe as a whole and can subsequently be assigned to someone else. The only 
other way in which he can lose his right to land is by confiscation, if he is 
found guilty of some serious crime.84 
 
Land seldom changed hands, and when it did it was not through the market 
mechanism. Now, this on its own does not complicate the formalist position. For 
pre-colonial Africa, Hopkins had very satisfactorily reconciled the non-existence of 
markets in particular commodities and factors with economic rationality through a 
marginalist logic of relative scarcity: there would be no impetus for a market in land 
to emerge if land were abundant. But this same logic runs short of explanatory 
power in twentieth-century Central Province: by the time of the Mau Mau Rebellion, 
land was anything but abundant, so a lack of land-market activity there could not 
possibly be chalked up to relative scarcity. 
 
The Substantivist Objection, the Institutionalist Response 
The substantivist objection is duly noted: it seems counterintuitive to identify 
outwardly non-market behaviour (in this case, a weak land market despite land 
scarcity) and then to propose that an approach from market economics is best suited 
to deal with it. How, then, to reconcile the economic contradiction and justify the 
approach suggested here? 
The brief review of the formalist/substantivist debate in the pre-colonial 
African context showed that the assumption of economic rationality has tended to 
provide a better starting point for inquiry than the alternative. But even if Hopkins 
and his fellow formalists were convincing in their dismissal of substantivism, they 
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84 I. Schapera and A. J. H. Goodwin, ‘Work and Wealth’, in I. Schapera (ed.), The Bantu-Speaking 
Tribes of South Africa (London: Routledge, 1937), p. 157. This was an account of the Bantu of South 
Africa, but such a description of land relations was held to be equally apropos for the Kikuyu of 
Kenya. See Paul Bohannan, ‘Africa’s Land’, The Centennial Review IV (1960); Jomo Kenyatta, Facing 
Mount Kenya (London: Secker and Warburg, 1938). 
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had merely changed the direction of scholarship in African economic history – they 
did not conclusively settle it. Indeed, for a time even the formalist position fell 
largely out of favour as a theoretical influence in African economics and economic 
historiography. Approaches from market economics faded in prominence during the 
1970s and 1980s, when radical pessimism enveloped African historians (and 
observers of Africa more generally): independence had rarely generated the 
economic fruits that had been hoped of it, and indeed in many countries real growth 
tragedies could be identified. Reacting to these disappointments, historians and 
economists turned away from traditional market economics and toward approaches 
thought best able to explain the depressing record: dependency theory; modes of 
production theory; and Marxist theories more generally. It looked as though 
formalism received from the pessimists the same rejection it had previously 
delivered to substantivism. 
The apparent rejection of formalism, however, was neither to be full nor long-
lived. This was because, at least as potential foundations for economic policy, 
radically pessimistic approaches to African economics did not have a long shelf life. 
Even if they were correct,85 upturning international relations and reorganising the 
economic world order – actions that a full acceptance of some of the pessimistic 
theories would seem to demand – were not practical approaches to policy 
formulation. And so, after a number of years spent out of fashion, market economics 
once again became the dominant policy influence in the 1980s through the 2000s, 
though not as a straight rebirth of the old market approach (which, of course, had 
done little to help avert Africa’s growth tragedy, and still was unable to account for 
observed economic inconsistencies – i.e. apparently economically irrational 
behaviour). In its stead, a market approach that included a more explicit political 
economy element emerged and, year by year, swelled with publications. This was 
where the new institutional economics came in. 
The project of new institutional economics, in essence, is to update the 
formalist position by not completely ignoring behaviour and observations that 
might be inconvenient to the formalist argument. In this way it has been described 
by some as a sort of middle ground between the formalist and substantivist schools, 
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though definitely closer in kin to the former.86 It starts with the assumptions of 
economic rationality and utility maximisation, and then seeks to explain deviations 
from these assumptions. Its general usefulness as an economic perspective receives 
testament from its mountainous and expanding literature. But its applicability in this 
paper’s specific case is also pronounced. As will be described below, the new 
institutional economics explicitly acknowledges the role constraints play in shaping 
economic behaviour. With land activity indeed constrained in Central Province, a 
new institutionalist approach appears especially apt. 
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86 Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness’, 
American Journal of Sociology 91:3 (1985), pp. 481-510. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
New Institutional Economics, the Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation, and the 
Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights 
With the substantivist objection responded to, and new institutional economics 
appropriately characterised as a market-economy approach to historical problems 
that revises (while never rejecting) formalism, the paper can move to elaborating 
upon the theoretical framework it will use to analyse the paradox noticed in eastern 
African land markets. It begins by introducing the new institutional economics and 
associated theories of institutional change. 
Neoclassical economic theory – fundamentally and significantly – assumes 
scarcity and thus competition for factors. As such, it has important things to 
contribute to the understanding of land economics. But it also assumes complete 
information and efficient factor markets, neither of which exist in reality. Indeed, 
informational asymmetries and transaction costs abound in the historical record.87 
The new institutional economics (NIE) is an attempt to modify neoclassical 
economics into a theory that includes incomplete information and transaction costs, 
and thus into a theory that recognises the human imposition of constraints that 
structure exchange.88 These constraints are institutions, defined as the rules through 
which economic activity is organised. Institutions can be formal rules (as in laws and 
regulations) or informal constraints (as in customs and norms).89 It is clear then that 
land tenure systems are institutions: they provide the rules through which land can 
be held, used, transferred, acquired, shared, etc. Therefore, NIE can help one 
understand changes in formal and informal land tenure systems, and so provides a 
theoretical framework with which to tackle this paper’s questions. 
Institutions change over time, and North and Thomas are concerned with the 
causes of these changes.90 Innovators adapt or replace existing institutions when the 
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87 Ronald H. Coase, ‘The nature of the firm’, Economica 4:16 (1937), pp. 386-405. 
88 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); idem, ‘The new institutional economics and third world 
development’, in John Harriss, Janet Hunter, and Colin M. Lewis (eds.), The New Institutional 
Economics and Third World Development (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 17-26. 
89 North, Institutions, chaps. 5-6; idem, ‘Third world development’, p. 23. 
90 Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, ‘An economic theory of the growth of the western 
world’, The Economic History Review 23:1 (1970), pp. 1-17; idem, The Rise of the Western World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). 
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benefits of innovation exceed their costs. In a state of equilibrium, costs exceed 
benefits and so accordingly there is no demand for innovation. Disequilibria, such as 
changing factor prices, create demand. So, North establishes a theory of institutional 
innovation wherein he suggests that demand for change comes about as a result of 
fundamental shifts in relative factor prices.91 Population growth is the primary cause 
of altered factor-price relations.92 
Following the leadership of North, and North and Thomas, development 
economists Ruttan and Hayami seek to understand how institutional innovations 
come about in rural areas of developing economies in their construction of “a theory 
of induced institutional innovation [III]”.93 As do their predecessors, they see 
institutional change as largely (though not exclusively) endogenous. Changes in 
relative factor endowments and prices, as well as technical change, induce demands 
for institutional innovation. When economic actors anticipate that adapting or 
creating institutions to deal with changed factor endowments, factor prices, and 
technical change will result in gains, institutional innovations are demanded.94 
Innovations must also be supplied. Some new institutionalists acknowledge 
that comprehending the supply of innovations is more challenging.95 A reason it is 
more challenging is that NIE often overlooks the most important aspect of the 
supply side: the political arena in which institutions operate and are selected. One of 
the weightiest critiques against the new institutionalism is that it is markedly 
apolitical, that it is based upon the choices of economic actors, and not upon the 
constraints they face.96 This assumption ignores the role of the state as supplier (and, 
indeed, often imposer) of institutions. In turn, this analytical omission makes it 
difficult to understand why some socially inefficient institutions are chosen. As the 
political scientist Robert Bates repeatedly points out, the explanation of many 
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91 North, Institutions; idem, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1981). 
92 Idem, Institutions, p. 84. 
93 Ruttan and Hayami, ‘Induced institutional innovation’. 
94 Ibid., p. 204. 
95 Ibid., pp. 205, 213. 
96 Robert H. Bates, ‘Social dilemmas and rational individuals: an assessment of the new 
institutionalism’, in John Harriss, Janet Hunter, and Colin M. Lewis (eds.), The New Institutional 
Economics and Third World Development (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 45-7. 
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institutional outcomes “requires political, not economic, analysis”.97 The demand for 
institutional change may come from changing factor-price relations and technical 
change, but the supply of it often cannot help but come from the polity.  
Fortunately, new institutionalists who deal explicitly with institutional 
change accept this. Ruttan and Hayami suggest that in a given society, the cost of 
reaching social agreements has a great bearing on the supply of innovations.98 The 
power structure of society is a primary determinant of this cost. In order to supply 
major institutional changes, innovators must mobilise considerable political 
resources. They hypothesise that institutional innovations will be supplied when the 
expected gains to be enjoyed by the political entrepreneurs exceed the costs of 
mobilising the necessary resources. North agrees that those with the greatest 
bargaining power are the ones who modify and create institutions, and, naturally, 
the modifications and creations serve this group’s interests.99 Seldom are institutions 
socially and economically efficient, because the political arena rarely approximates 
the prerequisites for efficiency.100 
Briefly, then, changing factor-price relations are the primary inducers of the 
demand for institutional innovations. If appropriate institutional innovations were 
supplied in concert with the demand for them, efficient institutional arrangements 
would result. However, given the political nature of the supply of innovations, 
institutional arrangements are less likely to be economically efficient, and more 
likely to benefit the holders of political power. 
One can thus understand why economically inefficient institutions are 
supplied. However, some institutions are quite simply inefficient altogether – that is, 
they do not succeed in structuring or constraining exchanges because economic 
actors ignore them. This is a point deserving particular pause in the context of this 
paper’s motivating paradox. The most striking feature about the land tenure systems 
of both Central Province and of Rwanda is that the formal institutions (the legislated 
rules) and the informal institutions (the customs to which inhabitants adhered) did 
not cohere: someone who read the relevant laws would not have an accurate picture 
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97 Ibid, p. 46; see also Bates, Beyond the Miracle, p. 11. 
98 Ruttan and Hayami, ‘Induced institutional innovation’, p. 213. 
99 North, ‘Third world development’, p. 20. 
100 Ibid.; idem, ‘A transaction costs theory of politics’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2:4 (1990), pp. 355-
67. 
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of inhabitants’ actual behaviour pertaining to landholding; conversely, someone 
who observed land markets in action “on the ground” would have little inkling into 
how land relations might look “on the books”. Indeed, the rules had an almost 
ethereal sense to them, floating in the legislation, “suspended in mid-air”,101 lightly 
scratching the ground if they touched it at all. 
North explains that occasionally formal rules change (e.g. new laws are 
introduced) but informal rules remain the same, effectively muting the attempted 
change.102 The suppliers of institutional innovations can introduce formal rules 
designed to supersede existing informal constraints. Occasionally this works, 
especially if the new rules respond to gradual shifts in the informal rules, but such a 
course of action is unlikely to produce its intended effects if the new rules represent 
a drastic, unsolicited alteration to the old. Radical impositions of new formal rules 
often go ignored by economic actors: “many informal constraints […] have great 
survival tenacity because they still resolve basic exchange problems among the 
participants, be they social, political, or economic”.103 Following up on North’s work 
on informal and formal institutions, Claudia Williamson empirically investigates 
(through a process of ‘mapping’) the relationship between the two.104 Vindicating 
North, she concludes that formal institutions are more prone to function (i.e. they 
succeed in their goal of constraining behaviour) if they map onto previously existing 
informal rules, less prone where they do not. 
There can thus be a situation in which a dual set of institutions exists – one 
formal, one informal, with only the latter holding sway. In such a scenario, the de 
jure institution is a product of the supply side, the de facto more likely a product of 
demand. As regards land, this provides insight into how formal and informal tenure 
systems need not necessarily cohere. 
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101 This imagery is borrowed from Goran Hyden, who originally used it to evoke the superficiality 
of African states/state structures left in the wake of colonial retreat. Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to 
Progress: African Development Management in Perspective (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 7. 
102 North, Institutions, p. 91. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Claudia Williamson, ‘Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic 
performance’, Public Choice 139 (2009), pp. 371-87; for another update (and reaffirmation) of North’s 
ideas on formal and informal institutions, see Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson, ‘Institutional stickiness’. 
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It is worth noting that III has been explicitly applied to land-rights 
institutions. The evolutionary theory of land rights (ELTR) is an outgrowth of III.105 
Unlike its more general parent theory, it concerns itself uniquely with how land-
rights institutions change over time. As with its parent theory, ELTR contends that 
population growth and the increasing commercialisation of agriculture play critical 
roles in directing institutional change: both contribute to the demand for the greater 
individualisation of land rights.106 Demand alone, however, is not enough to ensure 
that the process advances successfully. For its part, the state must supply the 
necessary institutional innovations, namely systems of land registration and titling. 
The state has an incentive to supply these because as the demand for land-rights 
individualisation grows, the state is faced with an increasing number of costly tasks 
(e.g. the settlement of land disputes). While initially land registration itself is too 
expensive to warrant the institutional change, the benefits of change begin to 
outweigh the costs and demand increases. ETLR is thus the application of III to land 
rights. However, given the aforementioned critiques of the new institutionalism, it is 
clear that ELTR oversimplifies the conditions surrounding the supply of land-rights 
innovations. 
To understand the evolution of both de facto and de jure land tenure systems in 
Central Province and Rwanda, the theories described above can be useful. The goal 
here is not to validate or even necessarily to test either theory, but to use them as 
heuristic devices, as inspiration for questions that will draw out the compelling 
stories of land tenure in the two cases. In the late-colonial and post-colonial periods 
of both countries, the two states, as suppliers of institutional innovations, followed 
divergent paths. At the same time, the landholders of Central Province and Rwanda 
behaved in ways contrary to those that their respective statutory institutions would 
have dictated. The supply of institutional innovations did not respond to the 
demand for them – the new formal rules represented too much of a break from the 
informal rules already in place. For the purposes of economic efficiency, there was 
not enough land-market activity to warrant the comprehensive, obligatory land-
registration programme in Central Province; conversely, there was too much activity 
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105 This is the theory supported by the World Bank; see World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa. For both a 
summary and critique of ELTR, see Platteau, ‘Evolutionary theory of land rights’. 
106 Feder and Noronha, ‘Land rights systems’, p. 143. 
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to justify its restriction in Rwanda. Accordingly, gaps emerged between the laws on 
the books and the ‘laws’ on the ground. When this point was reached, the demand 
side continued to shape the de facto institutions while the supply side shaped only 
the de jure ones. 
From this insight, this paper’s issue splinters into two distinct problems: it 
calls for an understanding of the two areas’ informal, de facto land tenure 
institutions, as well as an understanding of the formal, de jure institutions. III and 
ELTR can offer further perspective by exploring, respectively, the demand and 
supply sides of the land-rights innovations observed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE DEMAND FOR INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS
III and ELTR both suggest that changing factor-price relations are key causes of the 
inducement of the demand for institutional innovation. As land grows scarcer and 
more valuable, landholders demand less ambiguous private property rights in land. 
Though the demand side may not explain the evolution of formal, de jure institutions 
(because of the inherently political arena in which they are supplied), an 
understanding of the demand side should help in understanding the informal, de 
facto institutions that exist. 
 Land markets grew more active than predicted in post-colonial Rwanda, but 
remained more constrained than predicted in Central Province, Kenya. That said, 
data from the 1980s show that land-market activity in the two areas was broadly – if 
unexpectedly – similar.107 Land is more fully saleable when rights to it are more 
individualised. III and ELTR would suggest that given similar levels of market 
activity, the combinations of land scarcity and land values in each area must have 
led to comparable degrees of demand for individualised land rights. This hypothesis 
can be explored through a time-series comparison of the two areas’ populations as 
well as the respective degrees to which agricultural was commercialised. Population 
growth increases land scarcity,108 and agricultural commercialisation leads to the 
growing value of land. 
 
Population density 
With comparable levels of land-market activity in Rwanda and Central Province, 
one might hypothesise that the areas’ population densities (and thus degrees of 
pressure on land) were similar in the decades following independence. It is, of 
course, necessary to use population density (rather than total population) as a 
measure because Rwanda and Central Province differ in total area, the former being 
about double the size of the latter. 
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107 Migot-Adholla et al., ‘Indigenous land rights’, p. 162. 
108 Unless the pressures are so extreme as to lead to a Geertzian agricultural involution. See Clifford 
Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
and London: University of California Press, 1963). 
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 It should be noted at this point that a more satisfactory analysis of population 
density would take into account the quality of land on which inhabitants lived. As a 
simple illustration of why this makes a difference, consider the comparability 
between 100 inhabitants living on a single square kilometre plot of a fertile highland 
and 100 inhabitants living on a single square kilometre plot in a dessert. Clearly, 
actual population density and practical population density are two quite different 
measures. 
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109 Constructed from: Republic of Kenya, Kenya Population Census, 1962 (Nairobi: Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development, 1966); idem, Kenya Population Census, 1969 (Nairobi: Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning, 1970); idem, Kenya Population Census, 1979 (Nairobi: Central 
Figure 1: Population Density, 1960-1990109 
 
Table 3: Population Density, 1960-1990 
 Central Province Rwanda 
1960 101a d104d 
1970 127b d141d 
1980 178c d213d 
1990 237e d272f 
Notes: 
a: 1962; b: 1969; c: 1979; d: 1981; e: 1989; f: 1991 
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Regrettably, though there exists a thorough breakdown of land area by 
productive potential in Central Province,110 no such equivalent for Rwanda has been 
compiled as of yet. Even if one had been, the dynamic nature of land’s productive 
potential would limit the usefulness of such a resource in an examination of practical 
population density over decades (though, to be sure, it would still be very welcome). 
Thankfully, any differences in actual and practical population density in the two 
cases will not be as extreme as those in the highland/desert example above. As 
Central Province and Rwanda are both largely made up of fertile forested highlands, 
using actual population density as a direct (though imperfect) proxy for practical 
population density is acceptable until the research gap is filled. 
Though the Kenyan government published national population estimates 
annually, disaggregated figures for Central Province only exist for years during 
which censuses were conducted: 1962, 1969, 1979, and 1989. These reveal a 
population density climbing from 101 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1962 to 
237 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1989. 
 Figures for the Rwandan population are more readily available. These include 
the results of two censuses (1978, 1991), a post-census inquiry (1981), and estimates 
made every five years by the country’s Office National de la Population. These show a 
population density climbing from 104 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1960 to 
272 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1991. 
Population densities in Rwanda and in Central Province grew at similar rates 
from 1960 to 1991 (see Figure 1 and Table 3 on the previous page). If all available 
data points are included in the analysis,111 the trend line for Rwanda’s population 
indicates an average annual growth rate of 3.43 per cent over the period. For Kenya, 
the trend line denotes only slightly slower growth at 3.26 per cent per annum. 
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Bureau of Statistics, 1981); idem, Kenya Population Census, 1989: Volume I (Nairobi: Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 1994); Office National de la Population, Le Problème Démographique au Rwanda et le Cadre de 
sa Solution (Kigali: Office National de la Population, 1990), p. 10; République Rwandaise, Recensement 
général de la population et de l’habitat, 1978: résultats définitifs (Kigali: Bureau National de Recensement, 
1978); idem, Enquête démographique post-censitaire: Août 1981 (Kigali: Ministère du Plan, 1987); idem, 
Recensement général de la population et de l'habitat au 15 août 1991: résultats provisoires (Kigali: Service 
National de Recensement, 1991); idem, Recensement général de la population et de l'habitat au 15 août 
1991: résultats préliminaires (Kigali: Service National de Recensement, 1992). 
110 Food and Agriculture Organization, Agro-Ecological Land Resources Assessment for Agricultural 
Development Planning: A Case Study of Kenya Resources Data Base and Land Productivity: M: Main Report 
(Rome: FAO, 1993). 
111 If only the earliest and latest data points are considered for both areas, Central Province’s 
average annual growth rate is actually slightly higher than that of Rwanda. 
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Nevertheless, throughout the period Rwanda’s density was always the greater of the 
two, and the last available census figures reveal a substantial difference (272 
inhabitants per square kilometre in Rwanda, 237 in Central Province). Thus, 
according to III and ELTR, population figures and rates of growth for the period 
would expect, ceteris paribus, land rights to be relatively more individualised, and 
land markets more active, in Rwanda than in Central Province.  
 
Commercialisation of agriculture 
Population growth leads to land scarcity – one cause of the demand for 
individualised property rights. Another cause is the growth of land values. The 
increased commercialisation of agriculture leads to this. 
 Measuring the extent to which agriculture is commercialised is a difficult 
task. While finding figures for marketed surplus is simple enough, finding the 
relative share of total agricultural output they represent is much more complicated. 
The problem lies in finding the non-marketed or informally marketed share, 
something formal economic indicators do not capture. One must rely on indirect 
methods: asking questions about market integration or labour markets, for instance, 
can help reveal the degree to which agriculture is commercialised. 
 Unfortunately, if finding the extent to which agriculture in one area is 
commercialised is difficult, finding adequate data for a time-series comparison 
between two areas is all the more challenging. Further complicating the issue for this 
paper’s comparison is that one area (Rwanda) requires data at the national level, the 
other (Central Province) at the provincial level. The latter proved a challenge, as 
disaggregated Kenyan data appropriate for the task were difficult to locate. 
 Examining prices in multiple areas in a country can show if there is price 
convergence. Price convergence indicates market integration. A lack of market 
integration would suggest that agriculture is not very commercialised. A 
comparison between Rwanda and Central Province using agricultural price data 
was not possible because the data available for Rwanda only indicate prices in 
Kigali, and thus are insufficient to test convergence.112 
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112 Data were presented thusly in e.g. République Rwandaise, Bulletin de Statistique Numéro 1 Juillet 
1964 (Kigali: Ministère du Plan de la Coopération et de l’Assistance Téchnique, 1964); idem, Bulletin 
de Statistique Numéro 56 Janvier 1978 (Kigali: Ministère du Plan, 1978); etc. 
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 Examining labour markets is another indirect way to determine the extent to 
which agriculture is commercialised. If a labourer is receiving wages to work on a 
farm, it is fair to assume that said farm is not merely engaged in subsistence 
agriculture. A comparison between Rwanda and Central Province using labour-
market data was not possible because for Central Province, data for wage labourers 
by sector and industry were available, as were data for wage labourers by province 
and district, but no data existed for wage labourers by sector/industry and 
province/district.113 
 Another approach is to determine the proportion of land devoted to certain 
crops. Some crops are classified as export crops or non-food cash crops. While a 
time-series comparison is not possible for want of ample Central-Province data, data 
do exist for the mid-1970s. In Rwanda in 1973, 5.1 per cent of arable land was 
devoted to export crops and non-food cash crops.114 In Central Province in 1974, 19.7 
per cent of arable land was devoted to export crops and non-food cash crops.115 This 
hints at greater commercialisation in Central Province than in Rwanda. Of course, 
surpluses need not head to foreign markets for agriculture to be commercialised, 
and indeed a great deal of surplus in both countries was destined for domestic 
markets. The task of finding another proxy that can help determine in which area 
agriculture was more commercialised remains. 
 Looking at rates of urbanisation in the two areas can be helpful. With a higher 
rate of urbanisation comes a greater domestic market for agricultural production 
(because a smaller proportion of the population produces food for its own 
consumption), and so it stands to reason that agriculture is likely to be more 
commercialised in areas that are more highly urbanised. In the post-colonial period, 
Rwanda’s population was never very urbanised: under 5 per cent in the 1970s and 
just over 5 per cent by 1991.116 By contrast, Central Province had over 5 per cent of its 
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113 Data were presented thusly in e.g. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Statistical Abstract, 1960 
(Nairobi: East African Statistical Department, 1960); Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract, 1990 
(Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1990); etc. 
114 Joachim von Braun et al., Commercialization of Agriculture Under Population Pressure: Effects on 
Production, Consumption, and Nutrition in Rwanda (International Food Policy Research Institute, 1991), 
p. 8. 
115 Republic of Kenya, The Integrated Rural Surveys 1976-79: Basic Report (Nairobi: Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 1981), pp. 109-13. 
116 République Rwandaise, Enquête démographique; idem, Résultats préliminaires. 
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population living in urban areas in the 1970s, and almost 10 per cent by 1989.117 The 
difference becomes all the more pronounced when the national rates of urbanisation 
in Kenya are considered (15 per cent in the 1970s, and 18 per cent in 1989). With 
Nairobi sitting just at the border of Central Province, a great deal of agricultural 
surplus in Central Province would have been destined to the Kenyan capital. 
 With more arable land devoted to export crops and non-food cash crops and 
with higher rates of urbanisation creating a larger domestic market for agricultural 
production, it is reasonable to suggest that Central Province boasted higher levels of 
agricultural commercialisation than did Rwanda in the post-colonial period. Ceteris 
paribus, this would suggest that there should have been greater demand for 
individualised land rights, and a stronger emergence of land markets, in Central 
Province than in Rwanda. 
 
Remarks 
III and ELTR would suggest that given the similar emergence of land markets in 
Rwanda and Central Province, there must have been similar demand for 
individualised property rights. A time-series comparison between the two areas’ 
population densities shows that Rwanda was more densely populated than Central 
Province throughout the post-colonial period, and therefore land was always scarcer 
there. Though the commercialisation of agriculture in both places could not be 
measured with as much precision, the general impression is that agriculture was 
more commercialised in Central Province, and thus land was ostensibly more 
valuable there. 
 Unfortunately, ELTR is a broad theory, and does not weigh the relative 
importance of land scarcity and growing land values – it states only that the two 
forces lead to the demand for individualised land rights.118 Nevertheless, this 
section’s findings make the similar degrees of de facto individualised land rights, and 
by extension land-market activity, at the very least reconcilable: Rwanda was to 
some extent more densely populated than Central Province, but agriculture was 
more commercialised in Central Province. These demand-side factors thus appear to 
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117 Republic of Kenya, Kenya Population Census, 1989: Volume VI – Migration and Urbanization 
(Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1994), pp. 35-42. 
118 Platteau, ‘Evolutionary theory’, pp. 34-6. 
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explain the growth of similarly sized land markets in the cases, one land market 
much more modest than formal laws would have predicted, and another much more 
vibrant than formal laws would have allowed. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  THE SUPPLY OF INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS
When applied to land rights, the demand side of III and ELTR is reasonably well 
understood: changing factor-price relations and technical change induce the demand 
for modified or entirely new property-rights institutions. As land becomes scarcer 
and more valuable, landholders demand stronger, less ambiguously defined private 
property rights. Land markets should develop as a result. Still, formal institutional 
innovations must also be supplied. The dynamics of the supply side are more 
complicated. 
 Though many new institutionalists have ignored this,119 institutional 
innovations require the mobilisation of significant political resources. Bates, North, 
and Ruttan and Hayami understand that economic institutions are inherently 
political and that they operate within the political arena. Institutional innovations 
are only supplied when gains to those with the power to supply them exceed the 
costs of bringing about change. The complexion of the members of society holding 
political power accordingly has a decisive influence on the supply of innovations, 
and on the nature of innovations supplied. This means that efficient formal 
institutions may not be supplied at all, and, indeed, economically inefficient 
institutions may be supplied in their stead. It also means that the formal institutions 
risk being ignored in favour of existing, more efficient informal institutions, as 
appeared to be the situation in this paper’s cases. 
A step is thus taken toward understanding why the formal land-market 
institutions supplied by the Kenyan and Rwandan states in the late- and post-
colonial periods did not appear to respond to the corresponding economic demands. 
From here, this paper offers hypotheses, necessarily tentative, as to why the two 
states supplied the formal land-market institutions that they did. 
 
Central Province 
In 1954, the Swynnerton Plan proposed land reform in the Native Reserves of 
Central Province. The reforms called for the registration of land, one result of which 
was to be the activation of land markets. The Plan did not only anticipate 
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119 For criticisms of the new-institutionalist tendency to understate the role of politics in the 
adaptation and creation of institutions, see e.g. Pranab Bardhan, ‘The new institutional economics 
and development theory: a brief critical assessment’, World Development 17:9 (1989), pp. 1389-95; Jack 
Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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landlessness, but celebrated it: the development of landed and landless classes was 
considered part of the modernisation process; those who acquired more land would 
ostensibly be the best farmers. 
With the Native Lands (Registration) Ordinance of 1959, the late-colonial 
Kenyan state supplied the institutional innovation of private ownership of land, 
through registration and titling, to the inhabitants of Central Province. The post-
colonial Kenyan state embraced the idea, extending the provision of private 
ownership elsewhere in the country with the Registered Land Act of 1963. The 
legislative debates in council that preceded both land-registration laws indicate that 
a key reason the holders of political power wanted individualised land tenure was 
to activate land markets. Prior to the adoption of the former law, the Minister of 
African Affairs offered his vehement support for it, praising how it would “provide 
facilities which native law and custom [did] not, for transfer and other dealings in 
land”.120 
So the governments attempted to promote the development of land markets, 
despite a clear lack of demand for them in terms of economic behaviour. As 
established earlier, land markets in Central Province were constrained before and 
after land was made a legally saleable commodity.121 This fact was not lost on the 
supporters of land-market activation: government officials noticed the weak 
demand for land markets at multiple junctures before and after they were 
encouraged.122 
ELTR would suggest that the state supplied land markets when the de facto 
land-market activity was enough to justify the cost. This was not the case, but, as 
recognised earlier, ELTR wrongfully downplays the political nature of the supply of 
innovations. Taking into consideration the political nature of the supply side of 
institutional innovations, NIE would suggest that promoting the development of 
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120 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council Debates Official Report, 11th Council 
Inaugurated October, 1956: Volume LXXX (Part I) – Third Sessions 21st April, 1959, to 23rd May, 1959 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1959), p. 64. 
121 Lars-Erik Birgegard, ‘Natural resource tenure: a review of issues and experiences with emphasis 
on sub-Saharan Africa’, Rural Development Studies 31 (1993); Coldham, ‘Effect of registration’; 
Haugerud, ‘Consequences of land tenure reform’; Migot-Adholla and Bruce, ‘Introduction’; Migot-
Adholla et al., ‘Security of tenure’; Frank Place and Shem E. Migot-Adholla, ‘The economic effects of 
land registration on smallholder farms in Kenya: evidence from Nyeri and Kakamega districts’, Land 
Economics 74:3 (1998), pp. 360-73. 
122 Government of Kenya, The Million-Acre Settlement Scheme, 1962-1966 (Nairobi: Government 
Printer, 1966), p. 25. 
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land markets was perceived as beneficial to the holders of Kenyan political power. 
Even though the supply was not in response to an economic demand for land 
markets, and thus to create an institutional framework that was more economically 
efficient, the state might have supplied the innovation because the benefits of such 
an innovation would accrue to the politically powerfully – those with influence over 
the supply. 
 Of course, one should not ignore the stated intentions of the architects of land 
reform. It was suggested that land markets would put land in the hands of the best 
farmers, and in so doing they would increase agricultural productivity in the areas 
in which they were activated.123 There was also the recognition that land markets 
would provide a source of income for the government, as the government would 
collect stamp duties for approving land transactions.124 In addition to these 
justifications, this paper puts forth another hypothesis. 
The laws that called for the registration of land hitherto held under customary 
tenure in Central Province must be seen as part of a larger process of land reform 
that included the settlement schemes in the former White Highlands. Hence, in 
essence there were two types of land reform in post-colonial Kenya: the 
individualisation of land on the former Native Reserves, and the distribution of 
formerly European-owned land to Africans. 
 Individualisation of land was to be achieved through its registration, at which 
point a registered parcel became subject to British (rather than customary) law, and 
became a fully saleable commodity. This last point is crucial, and the need for 
unconstrained land markets was repeated time and again by the proponents and 
architects of private tenure in Kenya. In the 1950s, the East Africa Royal Commission 
decried the idea of ethnic groups restricting transactions to members of the same 
group: “Positive action must be taken by Governments to induce these exclusive 
communities to put land within their boundaries to full use themselves, or to make it 
available for others”.125 Later, in the 1960s, the authors of the Report on the Mission on 
Land Consolidation and Registration affirmed: “Registration must… lead to greater 
mobility in the transfer of land among all the people of Kenya without restriction as 
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123 Swynnerton, A Plan. 
124 Kenya, Million-Acre, p. 25. 
125 Great Britain Colonial Office, East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, Cmd. 9475 (London: 
H. M. Stationery Office, 1955), p. 348. 
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to tribe”.126 In principle, registered lands on former Native Reserves in Central 
Province were to be part of the same non-exclusive land market as those on the 
former White Highlands. 
 The Africanisation of the Highlands was the second type of land reform in 
post-colonial Kenya. The government purchased land from departing European 
farmers and then implemented a number of settlement schemes – the Million-Acre 
Settlement Scheme the largest and most well known of these – to populate the then-
vacant tracts of land with African farmers.127 Though certain schemes endeavoured 
to give land to the landless or land-poor, it was always the already rich (and, often, 
politically powerful) who received the best land, the larger tracts of land, and the 
most help in developing it.128 Many of the ‘winners’ of the settlement schemes were 
part of the post-colonial government’s power base. 
 Large farmers were thought to be the most productive, and indeed were 
helped to be so.129 Land markets were thought to put land in the hands of the most 
productive, leaving only the least productive (and least wealthy) landless.130 The 
registration of land in Central Province put all land legally in the same land market 
as those favoured farmers in the Highlands. Had land markets not remained 
constrained by custom, their activation through registration could have been to the 
economic benefit of the government’s power base in the Highlands by giving them 
control over more land – the newly registered land in Central Province. Indeed, in 
practice this occasionally occurred: there are examples of subsistence farmers on the 
edges of Central Province transferring their land to large landholders in the 
Highlands.131 The intention may well have been to make this kind of disequalising 
land transfer occur more frequently. 
 It is worth repeating that given the nature of the supply side of institutional 
innovations, hypotheses about why the land tenure innovations of Kenya were 
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126 Government of Kenya, Report on the Mission on Land Consolidation and Registration in Kenya 1965-
1966 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1966), p. 25. 
127 Kenya, Million-Acre. 
128 Leo, ‘Failure of the ‘progressive farmer’’; Jennifer A. Widner, The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: 
From “Harambee!” to “Nyayo!” (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992). 
129 Leo, ‘Failure of the ‘progressive farmer’’, p. 623. 
130 Swynnerton, A Plan. 
131 Colin Leys, ‘Politics in Kenya: The Development of Peasant Society’, British Journal of Political 
Science 1:3 (1971), p. 320. 
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supplied can only be tentative at best. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
they were supplied in spite of (and, indeed, with the recognition of) the lack of 
economic demand for them because land markets would: (i) ostensibly improve 
agricultural productivity; (ii) offer a source of income through the approval of 
transactions; (iii) if activated, put more land in the hands of Kenya’s power base, and 
thus improve their economic circumstances. 
 
Rwanda 
In 1960, the Belgians abolished the quasi-feudal, Tutsi-dominated system of 
landholding and introduced in its stead a less hierarchical property-rights regime.132 
The benefits of this change accrued to the demographically dominant Hutu 
agriculturalists. This new favouritism would prove a defining colonial legacy: Hutus 
would monopolise political power as Rwanda entered its post-independence period. 
 Ethnic identities were particularly salient in Rwanda.133 Though it was much 
more flexible in the pre-colonial period, the Hutu/Tutsi distinction was indeed a 
real one, to be further reified by the Belgians in the colonial period.134 This 
strengthened division survived the transition to independence. Throughout the 
country’s post-colonial history, political power tended to be dominated by one of 
these two largest ethnic groups. This would be to the social, political, and economic 
detriment of the other group. As regards land tenure institutions, it is significant that 
it was a Hutu government that passed the only post-colonial legislation concerning 
land in 1976. 
 With the land-transaction restrictions of 1976, the Hutu government did not 
supply the institutional innovation to support the emergence of land markets. 
Instead, it attempted to constrict land markets, despite a demand for them in terms 
of economic behaviour. Taking into consideration the political nature of the supply 
side of institutional innovations, NIE would suggest that restricting the 
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132 ‘Régime foncier’, p. 1136; André, ‘Droits fonciers’, pp. 6-7. 
133 Gareth Austin, ‘The effects of government policy on the ethnic distribution of income and wealth 
in Rwanda: a review of published sources’, unpublished report (World Bank: 1996), p. 1; Chrétien, 
Great Lakes of Africa, pp. 281-2. 
134 For descriptions of the flexibility and malleability of ethnicities in pre-colonial Rwanda, and pre-
colonial Africa more generally, see e.g. Mahmood Mahmood, ‘From conquest to consent as the basis 
of state formation: reflections on Rwanda’, New Left Review 216 (1996), pp. 3-36; idem, Citizen and 
Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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development of land markets was perceived as beneficial to the Hutu government, 
even if at a cost to economic efficiency. 
As with Kenya, the stated intentions of the legislators must be considered. 
Article 3 of the 1976 law itself rather unambiguously reveals these: land markets 
were discouraged to prevent the creation of sub-economic plots (would-be sellers 
must retain a minimum of two hectares), and to prevent land concentration (would-
be buyers must not come into possession of more than two hectares).135 This paper 
puts forth a hypothesis as to why land concentration was unwelcome. 
 Despite the fact that they were the victors of the Hutu Revolution, the Hutu 
government in the post-colonial period was publically wary of the ostensibly 
advantaged position the Tutsi held in society. In the post-colonial period, national 
newspapers warned how Tutsis were richer, and had better access to bank loans and 
rural credit.136 This was, of course, a dubious assumption. Though one survey from 
the 1950s revealed that Tutsis were nearly 5 per cent richer than Hutus on average,137 
their marginally superior position all but certainly declined following the Hutu 
Revolution. There is little empirical evidence suggesting that Tutsis enjoyed the 
better share of the ethnic distribution of national income in the post-colonial 
period.138 However, if the government did in fact believe Tutsis were richer and had 
better access to rural credit, then insight into the 1976 law emerges. 
 If the impression was alive with Hutu power that the Tutsi population was 
generally wealthier and had better access to credit than the Hutu population, then 
Tutsis were thought more likely to be on the benefitting side of disequalising land 
transactions, with the Hutu peasantry bearing the brunt of resultant sub-economic 
plots and potential landlessness. In a country with low levels of urbanisation in 
which upward of 90 per cent of the population has consistently derived its 
livelihood from agriculture,139 ownership of land was crucial to economic power. 
Allowing an unconstrained land market would have removed power over the land 
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135 ‘Achat et vente’, p. 199. 
136 Jean-Pierre Chrétien et al. avec Reporters sans frontières, Rwanda: Les médias du génocide (Paris: 
Éditions Karthala, 1995), pp. 145-6. 
137 Austin, ‘Effects of government policy’, p. 7; Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 50. 
138 The official censuses did not track the distribution of income by ethnic group. 
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Developing Economies, 1992 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992), p. 468. 
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from the Hutu government, and would have potentially given the rival ethnic group 
an opening to reacquire some of the economic power lost in the 1959 rebellion. It can 
thus be hypothesised that the Hutu government introduced the heavy land-
transaction restrictions of 1976 in an attempt to preserve its support base’s economic 
power. 
As with Kenya, hypotheses about why a Hutu government chose to restrict 
land markets can only be tentative at best. However, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that they were restricted despite the economic demand for them because land 
markets would: (i) lead to sub-economic plots and peasant landlessness; and (ii) if 
activated, ostensibly put more land in the hands of Tutsis to the detriment of Hutus, 
thereby compromising the economic power of the Hutu government’s support base. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
Land is the fundamental factor of production, and the conditions under which it is 
held and used can significantly affect the economic behaviour of a society. Land’s 
importance is particularly pronounced in predominantly agrarian economies, 
including those of most of sub-Saharan Africa past and present. Histories of land 
tenure in Africa provide points of intrigue to the economic historian and 
development economist alike. 
 At the broadest level, this paper has helped – ever modestly – to fill the gap of 
baseline data and research on land in Africa so lamented by other researchers in the 
field. In so doing, it has contributed to the rapidly expanding literature on land 
tenure by demonstrating the explanatory power new institutionalist theories have in 
regards to the behaviour and rules surrounding land. If it can help to encourage the 
relevant actors to conceptualise of land tenure systems as institutions in the NIE 
sense, then innovations in this realm will stand a greater chance of joining the ranks 
of successful new institutions (i.e. effective land policies and laws). While 
policymakers and lawmakers may well intuit that future recommendations and 
implementations will only be heeded and respected if they take stock of the reality 
on the ground, one of NIE’s merits is that it provides a robust theoretical backing to 
this intuition. Going further, it also explains why this is the case – priceless 
knowledge for anyone trying to construct positive and effective land policy. 
More narrowly, this paper addressed a particular point of intrigue noticed in 
the development of east African land tenure systems. It presented twin, paradoxical 
phenomena that occurred in the region’s land markets in the post-colonial period. In 
Central Province, Kenya, land markets remained constrained despite a legal 
framework designed to activate them. In Rwanda, land markets developed despite 
laws designed to restrict them. This paradox was analysed by treating land tenure 
systems (both de jure and de facto) as institutions, and then scrutinising them through 
new institutionalist theories of institutional change, notably the theory of induced 
institutional innovation (III) and the closely-related evolutionary theory of land 
rights (ELTR). 
The paradox required a tripartite explanation. It asked: (i) why gulfs emerged 
between informal and formal land tenure institutions of the cases; (ii) why informal 
institutions produced similar levels of land-market activity in Rwanda and Central 
 LAND TENURE AND LAND MARKETS IN KENYA AND RWANDA 
!
! 53!
Province; and (iii) why formal institutions favoured land markets in Central 
Province. 
The first phenomenon was most striking: de jure land tenure institutions did 
not line up with the de facto ones. Formal land laws did not dictate economic 
behaviour, and economic behaviour seemed not to influence the creation of land 
laws. Some conceptual work in the new institutionalism acknowledges the 
inherently political nature of the supply of institutional changes. The supply of de 
jure institutions is not necessarily in concert with the demand – the economic 
behaviour that shapes de facto land tenure arrangements. De facto institutions are apt 
to persist despite the introduction of new formal rules if those rules are too 
revolutionary. Thus, NIE clarifies how there could be a chasm between de facto and 
de jure land tenure systems. From there, the issue splintered into two: understanding 
the informal land tenure institutions (which should be influenced by the demand 
side) and understanding the formal institutions (which should be dictated by the 
supply side). 
The demand side is well understood by III and ELTR. According to these 
theories, increasing land scarcity and growing land values drive the demand for 
private property rights in land. With private property rights comes the right to 
transfer land without restriction. The population densities of the two subject areas, 
gleaned from official censuses and other sources of demographic data, indicate that 
– ceteris paribus – land rights should have been more individualised (and so land 
markets more active) in Rwanda than in Central Province. But all was not equal. 
Data that were available for the commercialisation of agriculture suggest that 
agriculture was more commercialised in Central Province. The combinations of 
varying levels of population density and commercialisation of agriculture make 
comprehensible the similar emergence of individualised land rights and land 
markets in the two cases.  
The demand-side findings invite further research in at least three ways. 
Firstly, it was noticed that there was a data gap that necessitated the use of actual 
population density in place of practical population density, the latter of which 
would be more insightful for conclusions. Central Province has had its land area 
thoroughly analysed and broken down by productive potential, but Rwanda has 
not. Therefore, the discussion remained limited to a comparison between actual 
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population densities, for which good data exist in the forms of censuses and related 
demographic enquiries. 
Secondly, the commercialisation of agriculture section reads like a laundry list 
of limitations. That (probable) higher commercialisation in Central Province can 
only be established in the mid-1970s is a weakness. A more systematic time-series 
comparison would help make the findings more robust, and perhaps reveal a 
dynamism that could not be captured with one-off reference points. Moving 
forward, satellite mapping of crop rotations could indeed help reveal 
commercialisation, insofar as certain crop groups are accepted plainly as either 
commercial or subsistence. Unfortunately, a dearth of historical agricultural maps 
makes the endeavour tricky if one wishes to prod back in time. 
As a third invitation to further research, it was noticed that there is an 
opening in III and ELTR that warrants filling. Current iterations of the theories do 
not state the relative importance of growing land scarcity versus rising land value 
when explaining the demand side of land-rights innovations. Of course, this might 
be a concession to the fact that the relative importance may vary just as surely as the 
contexts do. Nevertheless, it would be enlightening to explore this apparent gap in 
the theories, and future research may make clearer the weight one should assign 
population density vis-à-vis the commercialisation of agriculture for the demand for 
individualised land rights. 
The supply side of institutional innovations is more difficult to explore. What 
is clear is that it strongly influences the existence of de jure institutions. Work in NIE 
that recognises the political nature of the supply side explains why institutional 
innovations are not always supplied in response to demand: what is regarded as 
beneficial for the suppliers of institutional innovations may not necessarily be most 
economically efficient; the interests of suppliers may be considerably out of step 
with the generalised demand of an economy. 
From this understanding, the paper proceeds to tender hypotheses as to why 
the Kenyan and Rwanda states supplied the innovations that they did. The 
suggestions made here are just that: suggestive. Though these should be treated with 
caution, this paper offers the hypotheses that: (i) the Kenyan government supplied 
the institutional innovation of land registration in Central Province, despite no clear 
demand for it, because it would render land part of single land market to which the 
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power base of the government would have access; and (ii) the Rwandan Hutu 
government restricted land markets because it feared the rival Tutsi ethnic group 
would benefit disproportionately from disequalising land transfers and thus gain 
economic power. Future research may better, more systematically elucidate why the 
politically powerful groups supplied the institutional innovations they did. At this 
juncture, this paper transmits a familiar theme in the literature on induced 
institutional innovation: the challenge of comprehending the supply side. 
In the meantime, what is important to reiterate is that de jure institutions do 
not always respond to economic demand – they are not always economically 
efficient – precisely because those with political power control their supply. Some 
new formal rules represent such a break with the existing informal constraints that 
the former are ignored. This realisation is key in comprehending this paper’s 
motivating paradox. A chasm emerges between the de jure and de facto land tenure 
systems of a country when the supply of land tenure institutions does not provide 
an appropriate response to the demand for them. This paper illustrated how this 
was the case in Kenya and in Rwanda, but the idea can be further extended and 
investigated in other contexts across space and time. What was found to be true of 
Central Province and of Rwanda is almost certainly true elsewhere in sub-Saharan 
Africa and in the wider world: there is often one law on the books, another on the 
ground. This paper has shown that insights from the new institutional economics 
can be used rewardingly in the investigation of such discrepancies. 
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